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United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey-
State Promises and the Contract Clause:
An Untimely Resurrection
The contract clause of the Federal Constitution provides:
"No state shall . . . pass any . . .Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts. . . ."I As the only direct restraint on state actions
affecting private property until the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment,2 the contract clause was once fertile ground for con-
stitutional litigation.3 But in the early twentieth century the
growing importance of substantive due process as a check on state
economic regulation obscured the provision's role.' By the De-
pression era, the Supreme Court's eventual recognition of broad
governmental powers to regulate economic activity had rendered
the contract clause, along with substantive due process, "vir-
tually moribund" in the constitutional scheme.' The recent deci-
sion in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,I however, subjects
alleged impairments of state contracts to rigorous scrutiny under
the contract clause and resurrects the provision as a powerful tool
of judicial review.
This comment examines the impact of United States Trust
on traditional contract clause doctrines and policies. After an
initial discussion of the factual and legal background, a historical
survey will show the decision employs a new approach to contract
clause analysis. Next, this comment will analyze the Court's new
approach, especially the Court's treatment of impairments when
a state is a contractual party, its willingness to make policy judg-
ments formerly left to legislative discretion, and the decision's
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
2. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 1), 57 HARv. L. Rav. 512,
512 (1944).
3. Merrill, Application of the Obligation of Contract Clause to State Promises, 80 U.
PA. L. REv. 639, 639 (1932).
4. Id.
5. B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITrON OF THE UNITE STATES: THE
RIGHTS OF PnoPERT 267 (1965). See 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLMCS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1054
(1953); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HARv. L. REv. 852,
890-91 (1944). This comment, however, will argue the subsidiary thesis that prior to
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), the contract clause still had a
viable, if somewhat limited, role in the constitutional scheme. See text accompanying
notes 80-83, 134-38 infra.
6. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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probable effect on any future municipal debt crises. Finally, in
accord with Justice Brennan's dissent in United States Trust,
this comment will conclude that the Court's former approach to
contract clause issues was superior because the Court recognized
the need for broad state powers to regulate governmental obliga-
tions.
I. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES TRUST
In 1962 the New York and New Jersey legislatures enacted
legislation restricting the Port Authority of New York's operation
of deficit producing commuter railraods.7 Although the legislation
authorized the Port Authority to acquire and operate the bank-
rupt Hudson and Manhattan mass transit system,8 the legisla-
tures also created a statutory covenant between the states and
Port Authority bondholders as an additional security measure for
private investors.' By the covenant's terms, the states promised
bondholders that the Port Authority would not apply any reve-
nues or reserve funds for commuter railroad operations, except
the Hudson and Manhattan or the "permitted railroad purposes"
defined in the agreement.'0 The covenant's "permitted purposes"
7. 1962 N.J. Laws ch. 8, § 6 (prospectively repealed 1972) (current version at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.55 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)); 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 209, § 6
(prospectively repealed 1972) (current version at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAwS § 6606 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)). The two states jointly control the Port Authority by the terms
of a bi-state compact. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-1 to -174 (West 1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS §§ 6401-7154 (McKinney 1961). The states established the Port Authority to develop
a coordinated transportation system for both passengers and cargo within the Manhattan
region. Kheel & Kheel, The Port Authority 1962 Covenant-Bar to Mass Transportation,
27 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1973). Yet until 1962 the Port Authority did not participate in
any substantial mass transit operations. See id. at 7-9.
8. 1962 N.J. Laws ch. 8, § 3 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.52 (West 1963));
1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 312, § 2 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6602 (McKinney 1961)).
9. 1962 N.J. Laws ch. 8, § 6 (prospectively repealed 1972); 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 209,
§ 6 (prospectively repealed 1972). Port Authority bondholders feared that operating
deficit-producing commuter rail services would endanger the entity's fiscal strength.
When New Jersey proposed the acquisition of the Hudson and Manhattan, the Port
Authority consented but insisted on the covenant as a security device to protect its credit
rating. Kheel & Kheel, supra note 7, at 8-9. Stringent security measures, however, already
protected Port Authority investors. Under the Port Authority's Consolidated Bond Resolu-
tion, the agency irrevocably pledges all revenues and reserve funds as security for bond
issues. Id. at 9 n.44. In addition, the agency cannot issue new bonds unless projected
revenues equal 130% of the debt service due in the year the Port Authority's current and
proposed obligations are at a maximum. The Port Authority commissioners must also
certify that new bond issues will not materially impair the agency's ability to satisfy its
obligations. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
10. The covenant's "permitted purposes" allowed Port Authority involvement in
railroad freight transportation and maintenance of tracks on existing Port Authority
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allowed only self-supporting future rail projects or projects that
could operate within "permitted deficits.""
In practice, however, the covenant effectively barred the Port
Authority from new rail transit operations. 2 The legislatures pro-
spectively repealed the covenant in 1972 to allow increased Port
Authority participation in solving the Manhattan area's trans-
portation problems."3 Yet prospective repeal failed to solve fund-
ing problems for new projects; the covenant still protected out-
standing bonds until the year 2007.'1 In the interim, the legisla-
tures confronted mounting public concern over transit, energy,
and pollution problems.
In 1974, during a national energy crisis, the legislatures retro-
actively repealed the 1962 covenant. 5 The repeal was part of a
general plan to meet the Manhattan area's transit problems and
to bring the region's air quality into compliance with federal air
pollution standards." The legislatures sought to discourage auto-
mobile traffic through higher tolls on Port Authority bridges and
tunnels and to employ the increased revenue for improving and
expanding commuter rail services. 7 A congressional declaration
of a national energy emergency also prompted the retroactive
bridges and tunnels. 1962 N.J. Laws ch. 8, § 6 (prospectively repealed 1972); 1962 N.Y.
Laws ch. 209, § 6 (prospectively repealed 1972); see Kheel & Kheel, supra note 7, at 10.
11. See Kheel & Kheel, supra note 7, at 10. Under the "permitted deficits" formula,
the deficits from commuter rail operations could not exceed 10% of the Port Authority's
total bonded indebtedness. Id. Yet the projected deficit in 1962 for operating the Hudson
and Manhattan approximated the 10% figure. Id. Given the economics of mass transporta-
tion, self-sustaining commuter rail operations are impossible. Id. Accordingly, the cove-
nant effectively precluded any future Port Authority rail transit operations.
12. The states planned to build commuter rail links to John F. Kennedy and Newark
International Airports, but opinion letters from two New York law firms as well as a Port
Authority cost study concluded expansion was not feasible under the terms of the 1962
covenant. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 169-70, 338 A.2d 833,
859 (1975), aff'd, 69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
13. 1972 N.J. Laws ch. 208, § 2 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-35.55 (West Cum.
Supp. 1977-1978)); 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 1003, § 1 (codified at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6606
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
14. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 36 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
15. 1974 N.J. Laws ch. 25 (held unconstitutional, United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)); 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 993 (unconstitutional by implication,
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)).
16. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 36-41 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Both states were under pressure from citizen groups and the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1857 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 36-
39 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because automobile exhaust emissions create a major
air pollution problem in the Manhattan area, commuter rail services play an essential role
in the states' anti-pollution strategies. See id. at 36-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).
19781
302 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 1:299
repeal.'" The United States Trust Company of New York, how-
ever, a holder and trustee of affected bonds, brought suit against
both states contending the repeal impaired the obligation of Port
Authority bond contracts.
The New Jersey trial court held the repeal constitutional."9
It found that the repeal neither materially impaired the bond-
holders' security20 nor adversely affected the bonds' secondary
market value, except for a short term fall-off.2' The court held
that the contract clause does not prohibit reasonable exercises of
the state's police power. 2  Relying on Justice Cardozo's opinion in
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,13 the court found the repeal
reasonable because it did not destroy the bonds' quality as an
acceptable investment for a rational investor.2 4 Most signifi-
cantly, the trial court stated that parties who contract with a
state deal with a sovereign entity; thus, the sovereign's power to
alter obligations in the public interest inheres in the contract.
2 5
Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that impair-
ments of state contracts require more stringent judicial scrutiny
than those of private contracts.26 The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment without discussing the constitutional
issue.?
18. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 2, 87 Stat.
628 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 751(a)(3) (Supp. V 1977)).
19. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N.J. Super. 124, 338 A.2d 833 (1975), aff'd,
69 N.J. 253, 353 A.2d 514 (1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). Plaintiff's action against New
York remained pending in the Supreme Court of New York, County of New York, until
the United States Supreme Court ruled on the case. 431 U.S. at 4 n.4.
20. 134 N.J. Super. at 196, 338 A.2d at 874.
21. Id. at 181-82, 338 A.2d at 866. The trial court found that although the price of
Port Authority bonds fell immediately after the repeal, the bonds had fully recovered their
former value by the time of the trial. The court also noted that the bonds' "A" rating by
Moody's and Standards & Poor's financial surveys remained the same after the repeal.
Id. at 179, 338 A.2d at 864-65.
22. Id. at 197, 338 A.2d at 874.
23. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
24. 134 N.J. Super. at 195-96, 338 A.2d at 873-74.
25. Id. at 197, 338 A.2d at 872.
26. See McTamaney, United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey. The
Contract Clause in a Complex Society, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 32 (1977).
27. 69 N.J. at 253, 353 A.2d at 514 (1976). The United States Trust litigation in the
New Jersey courts also contained a class action complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
that the 1962 covenant was unconstitutional and requesting a court order directing the
Port Authority to develop a comprehensive mass transit plan. Although the trial court
dismissed the complaint, plaintiffs' appealed the decision to the state supreme court. Id.
at 256-57, 353 A.2d at 515. A majority of the court affirmed the entire trial court decision.
In a separate opinion, Justice Pashman, although concurring that the repeal was constitu-
tional, argued that inadequate transit services and the resulting air pollution problems
had created an emergency situation. Id. at 287, 353 A.2d at 533. Justice Pashman felt that
Contract Clause
The United States Supreme Court, however, emphasized
New Jersey's role as a party to the contract and held the law
unconstitutional. 8 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion" noted a
state cannot contract away an essential attribute of its sover-
eignty, such as its police power or power of eminent domain; if a
state attempts to do so, the contract is void ab initio.39 Yet a state
does have the power to enter into binding financial contracts. The
Court found the 1962 covenant a "purely financial" obligation not
within the inalienable state power doctrine.3' The repeal affected
an operative contract and the crucial question was whether the
impairment was permissible.
The opinion stressed that special judicial scrutiny is appro-
priate when a state impairs its own contract. The Court stated
that although courts usually give wide deference to legislative
discretion when state actions affect private contracts, complete
deference to legislative judgments is inappropriate when legisla-
tion affects a state's own financial interest.3 2 Justice Blackmun
reasoned that if states could reduce their financial obligations to
spend money in the public interest at will, the contract clause
would not protect the rights of state creditors. 33 Thus, the Court
refused to defer to the legislature's assessment of the repeal's
"reasonableness" and "necessity" because the state was a con-
tractual party. 34
The Court formulated a conjunctive standard of
"reasonableness" and "necessity" to test the repeal's constitu-
tionality.35 The Court analyzed the legislation's reasonableness
the complaint warranted a writ of mandamus directing the Port Authority to formulate a
regional mass transportation plan and to complete its existing mass transit projects. Id.
at 288, 353 A.2d at 533.
28. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
29. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens joined in Justice Blackmun's opinion. Chief Jus-
tice Burger concurred in a brief separate statement. See notes 119, 124 infra. Justices
Stewart and Powell did not participate. Justices White and Marshall joined in Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion.
30. 431 U.S. at 23-24.
31. Id. at 24-25; see text accompanying notes 61-67 infra. Although the covenant's
terms restricted only the Port Authority's use of funds, the practical effect and the appar-
ent purpose of the covenant was to bar additional mass transit projects. See note 11 supra.
Thus, the Court's characterization of the covenant as "purely financial" is somewhat
misleading.
32. 431 U.S. at 22-23, 25-26.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 29-32. This comment discusses three distinct conceptions of
"reasonableness." First, the "changed circumstances" reasonableness standard the Court
develops in United States Trust. See text accompanying notes 36-39, 119-23 infra. Second,
the "reasonableness" standard the Court formerly applied in contract clause analysis. See
1978]
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by contrasting the circumstances surrounding the covenant's
adoption and subsequent repeal. The Court found that the earlier
legislature foresaw and intended the covenant's restrictions on
mass transit operations.36 Despite a mounting transit and energy
crisis, 37 and extensive federal environmental legislation, 31 the
Court also found that the new circumstances prompting the re-
peal were merely changes in degree, not of kind, from problems
known to the legislature in 1962. 31 Consequently, under the
Court's changed circumstances standard, the covenant's repeal
was not "reasonable" because the state failed to show the con-
tract had unforeseen and unintended effects on state policy.
The repeal also failed to satisfy the Court's "necessity" crite-
rion. First, the Court inquired whether total repeal of the cove-
nant was necessary.'" It then suggested hypothetical alternatives
for achieving the state's goals through limited modifications of
the covenant and concluded such measures would be equally
effective.4 Second, the Court found that the state had alternative
measure availmahle to ntt.nin t.he rpnpnl's nhictives withollt modi-
fying the covenant at all.42 Accordingly, the repeal was not
"necessary" because the Court found the state could have pur-
sued its goals through less drastic means than total abrogation of
the covenant.4 3 Although the Court recognized the state action
served important public purposes," it held the repeal unconstitu-
tional.
Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent, however, argued that the
contract clause cannot bind states to contracts limiting the au-
thority of successor legislatures to enact laws in the public inter-
est.45 The dissent stressed that a fundamental premise of popular
text accompanying notes 68-94 infra. Finally, the "rational relation" standard the Court
formerly applied in due process analysis. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
36. 431 U.S. at 31-32.
37. See text accompanying notes 14-18 and note 27 supra.
38. See 431 U.S. at 35-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 31-32.
40. Id. at 29-31.
41. Justice Blackmun suggested that the legislatures could have amended the cove-
nant to remove restrictions from revenue generated by increased bridge and tunnel tolls.
Id. at 30 n.28. He also noted the legislatures could have modified the "permitted deficits"
formula, or adopted procedures to obtain consent from bondholders for increased transit
projects. Id. Justice Blackmun warned, however, that the Court expressed no opinion as
to whether any of these lesser impairments would be constitutional. Id.
42. Justice Blackmun noted that increased taxes on gasoline or parking would dis-
courage automobile use and provide funds for mass transit projects. Id. at 30 n.29.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id. at 28-29.
45. Id. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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democracy is that legislatures must remain responsive to the will
of the electorate." Accordingly, a rigid application of the contract
clause threatens the functioning of the political system by bind-
ing legislatures to the policies inherent in their predecessor's con-
tracts. 7 Justice Brennan argued that one hundred years of pre-
cedent demonstrated the need for judicial deference to legislative
actions challenged under the contract clause,48 and that the trial
court's constitutional standard correctly resolved the litigation.49
The dissent warned that the Court not only departed from the
policy values of previous decisions, but also fundamentally mis-
conceived the nature of the contract clause guarantee when state
contracts are at issue.5'
II. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND STATE PROMISES
Quite possibly the Constitution's framers did not intend the
contract clause to apply to state contracts.51 The economic dis-
tress following the Revolutionary War led to state laws, usually
favoring debtors, impairing the value of private contract rights.5
2
Discussions of the contract clause in the Constitutional Conven-
tion5 3 and The Federalist" referred only to the goal of protecting
contracts between individuals from legislative interference. No
historical evidence indicates that the framers intended a broader
application of the contract clause. 55
Marshall Court decisions, however, soon applied the clause
to state promises., Addressing the argument that state contracts
46. Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 270; Merrill, supra note 3, at 639. The adoption
of the eleventh amendment in 1798 also supports an inference that the framers did not
intend the contract clause to apply to state promises. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), the Supreme Court allowed an out-of-state creditor to recover a war debt
from Georgia in a suit tried in a federal court. The states, fearing for their treasuries,
reacted by ratifying the eleventh amendment which denies federal courts jurisdiction in
suits between nonstate residents and a state. See generally Abrahams & Mattis, The Duty
to Decide vs. the Daedalian Doctrine of Abstention, 1 U.P.S. L. Rv. 1, 50 (1977).
52. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 454-65 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
53. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 274; Merrill, supra note 3, at 639.
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison).
55. In fact, several members of the Constitutional Convention disputed such a
suggestion. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 274.
56. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (state law anulled deeds obtained
in prior state land sale); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (land tax
immunity granted by state not revocable against subsequent purchasers); Trustees of
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were outside the scope of the contract clause, Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated: "The words themselves contain no such distinction.
They are general and are applicable to contracts of every descrip-
tion."57 He also commented that the framers adopted the clause
to "establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviola-
ble. ", 58 Yet this great principle was also capable of binding legisla-
tures to foolish or corrupt policies embodied in their predecessor's
contracts.5" Chief Justice Marshall's application of the clause to
state contracts thus created a basic conflict between judicial pro-
tection of contract rights and the legislative power to implement
new social policy.
In later years the Court became sympathetic to the argument
that states could not abridge their legislative power by contract. 0
By the late nineteenth century, the Court had adopted the doc-
trine that legislatures could not bargain away a state's police
power.' The doctrine developed in cases where a state granted
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (attempt to alter college
charter).
57. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137 (1810).
58. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 206 (1819). The inherent consti-
tutional values the contract clause promotes, however, make Chief Justice Marshall's
thesis highly questionable. Historical evidence demonstrates that the framers adopted the
clause not only to protect the integrity of contract rights, but also to promote a stable
climate for trade and industry. See C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 178-83 (1913). Although a policy of protecting contract rights
applies equally to state and private obligations, the limited impact of impairments of state
contracts disrupts commercial activity far less than impairments of contracts between
individuals. Furthermore, a stable business climate presupposes a government with the
authority and ability to protect the social order. When public contracts threaten a state's
ability to safeguard society, then state compliance with such contracts violates an under-
lying policy of the contract clause. Accordingly, the contract clause's twin policies of
protecting individual contract rights and social stability may conflict when a state impairs
its own contracts. Given the framers' inattention to the unique problems of state contract
impairments, see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 270, 274, Chief Justice Marshall's exten-
sion of the contract clause was actually a "creative act of the first magnitude and one
which resulted in a virtual metamorphosis of the organic provision as it had left the
Framers' hands." Id. at 274.
59. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), for example, speculators bribed
all but one legislator to obtain passage of an act authorizing an extensive land sale. An
enraged public elected new lawmakers who promptly revoked the deeds obtained under
the former act. The Court's decision, which invalidated the revoking legislation, did not
meet with great public approval. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 274-76.
60. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 547-48
(1837). The Court in Charles River Bridge adopted a doctrine of strict construction of state
grants and contracts in favor of the state. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 280-83.
61. The Court, in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879), explained the doctrine's
rationale:
[T]he power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government,
no part of'which can be granted away. The people, in their sovereign capacity,
have established their agencies for the preservation of the public health and the
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contract rights directly affecting the public's health,"2 safety,63 or
morals; 4 when the subsequent exercise of the contract rights
threatened these interests, the Court allowed the state to impair
its prior promise. The doctrine's rationale rested on the Court's
determination that legislatures lacked the capacity to contract
away a state's basic governmental powers. 5 The inalienable po-
lice power doctrine prevented the contract clause from binding
states to contracts endangering vital public interests. 6 Yet the
doctrine also contained an important limit: the Court upheld
impairments only when a contract's subject matter compromised
a state's "inalienable" powers.6 7
public morals, and the protection of public and private rights. These several
agencies can govern according to their discretion, if within the scope of their
gcneral authority, while in power; but they cannot give away nor sell the discre-
tion of those that are to come after them, in respect to matters the government
of which, from the very nature of things, "must vary with varying circumstan-
ces."
Id. at 820.
62. E.g., Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878)
(ordinance prohibiting transportation of dead animals through a town upheld despite
fertilizer plant's charter).
63. E.g., Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 170 U.S. 57 (1898) (ordi-
nance requiring maintenance of public viaduct built by railroad companies did not impair
prior contract right to construct the viaduct).
64. E.g., Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878) (prohibition act did
not impair prior charter to brew beer).
65. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 2), 57 HAuv. L. REv.
621, 654-63 (1944); Merrill, supra note 3, at 660-67.
66. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 283-87.
67. See Note, The Constitutionality of the New York Municipal Wage Freeze and
Debt Moratorium: The Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. Rsv. 167, 179
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Resurrection of the Contract Clausel. Although the Court in
United States Trust found the covenant's subject-matter was "purely financial" and thus
treated it as an enforceable contract, see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra, the Court's
approach in previous contract clause decisions challenges the covenant's validity. In
Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876), for example, the Court invalidated
legislation diluting a reserve tax fund pledged as security for a bond issue. Nevertheless,
the Court stated:
We are not prepared to say that the legislature of a State can bind itself,
. . . not to create a further debt, or not to issue any more bonds. Such an
engagement could hardly be enforced against an individual; and, when made
on the part of a State, it involves, if binding, a surrender of a prerogative which
might seriously affect the public safety.
Id. at 535. Thus, the financial restrictions contained in the 1962 covenant are arguably
an impermissible abdication of the legislature's power. See Kheel & Kheel, supra note 7,
at 17-18.
The 1962 covenant, however, survived a similar attack on its validity in Kheel v. Port
of New York Authority, 331 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). aff'd, 457 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972). In Kheel, plaintiff argued that the covenant was an
unconstitutional delegation of future legislative authority to provide mass transit services.
331 F. Supp. at 119. The trial court, however, rejected the constitutional argument as
"illusory" and "premature." Id. at 122.
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In 1934, the Court in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell," made a "comprehensive restatement of the principles
underlying the application of the Contract Clause." 9 The Court
upheld Minnesota's mortgage moratorium law passed during the
depths of the Depression. The legislation, limited in duration and
prefaced by a declaration of economic emergency, protected de-
faulting mortgagors from foreclosure sales if they applied to a
local court and made reduced monthly payments. ' " Chief Justice
Hughes reasoned that the constitutional policy of protecting con-
tract rights presupposed the existence of state governments with
the authority to safeguard the vital interests of the people;" thus,
a "reservation of a reasonable exercise of the protective power of
the state is read into all contracts."" The Court formulated a new
standard for permissible contract impairments: "whether the leg-
islation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken
are reasonable and appropriate to that end. '7 3 Blaisdell, there-
fore, established that the contract clause permitted reasonable
exercises of the reserved legislative power to protect vital public
interests.7 4
Blaisdell also provided a new analytical approach to contract
clause litigation. First, the legislative power to alter obligations
no longer depended on the content of the affected contract.7 5 The
Court emphasized that the external circumstances of economic
distress justified the state's exercise of its reserved legislative
power. 6 Second, the Court expressly noted that the reservation
68. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
69. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965).
70. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 416 (1934).
71. Id. at 435.
72. Id. at 444.
73. Id. at 438.
74. Chief Justice Hughes based his interpretation of the contract clause on the ap-
proach Justice William Johnson developed a century earlier in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (state insolvency act does not impair obligation of contracts en-
tered into after passage of the statute). See Hale, supra note 5, at 880. Justice Johnson
argued that the framers intended the contract clause to prevent "arbitrary and tyrannical
legislation over existing rights." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 285. Yet "[slocieties exercise a
positive control as well over the inception, construction, and fulfilment of contracts." Id.
at 285-86. Noting that the framers wrote the constitution for "an advanced state of
society," id. at 282, Justice Johnson reasoned that a reading of the contract clause requir-
ing "rigid literal fulfilment" of contracts "could not have been the intent of the constitu-
tion." Id. at 285. Accordingly, Justice Johnson concluded "[it is the motive, the policy,
the object, that must characterize the legislative act, to affect it with the imputation of
violating the obligation of contracts." Id. at 290-91; see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428-29, 443-44 (1934).
75. See Resurrection of the Contract Clause, supra note 67, at 179-80.
76. 290 U.S. at 444.
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of legislative power formed a part of all contracts-private and
state contracts alike." Finally, Blaisdell established that legisla-
tures retained the power not only to impair contracts threatening
the public's health, safety, or morals, but also to make reasonable
alterations of contracts affecting the public's economic interests."
Blaisdell, therefore, did not focus on the subject matter of the
affected contract; instead, the Court centered its inquiry on the
"reasonableness" of the challenged legislation.79
Blaisdell's reasonableness standard, although superficially
similar to the "rational relation" due process standard pro-
nounced the same year in Nebbia v. New York, 8 did not devita-
lize the contract clause. The Court's analysis of reasonableness
centered on the economic emergency facing the legislature and
the legislation's effect on the contracts' value. The Court found
the moratorium's temporary measures did not impair the integ-
rity of the mortgagors' repayment obligation.81 Thus, Blaisdell,
unlike Nebbia, required more than a showing that the legislation
had a "rational relation to a proper legislative purpose." 82 The
Blaisdell standard also required that the circumstances surround-
ing the legislation warranted the state's exercise of its reserved
protective power, and that the measures left the basic contractual
obligation intact. Moreover, the Court's subsequent applications
of Blaisdell's reasonableness standard did not invariably uphold
contested legislation; contract clause decisions following Blaisdell
77. Id. at 435-36; see Minnesota Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 523 F.2d 581, 585
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
78. 290 U.S. at 437. Blaisdell's analysis also avoided wooden classifications of how a
law affected a contract. Formerly, the Court upheld laws that affected only remedial
contract rights, see, e.g., Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1881) (abolishing imprisonment
for debt does not impair underlying obligation to repay), but struck down laws directly
modifying the scope of contractual performance. See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (state insolvency law discharging debts contracted prior to the
act struck down).
79. See 290 U.S. at 447.
80. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
81. 290 U.S. at 447. Although Blaisdell's test of reasonableness centered on the lim-
ited duration of the legislation and the economic emergency which the state was experi-
encing, later decisions employing Blaisdell's approach required neither an emergency nor
a time limit on the relief. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32
(1940) (state may restrict shareholders' right to withdraw funds from savings and loan
associations without declaration of an economic emergency or limited time period).
82. The Court formulated the "rational relation" test to review economic regulations
challenged under the due process clause in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-39
(1934). Since Nebbia the Court has generally upheld economic regulations contested solely
on substantive due process grounds. Linde, Without "Due Process. "Unconstitutional Law
In Oregon, 49 ORE. L. Rav. 125, 163 & n.122 (1970).
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employed its basic approach to both overturn and uphold state
laws.8 3
In W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,84 the Court employed a
Blaisdell analysis to overturn legislation affecting state contracts.
The decision invalidated a state law reducing the remedies avail-
able to holders of delinquent municipal bonds. 85 Justice Cardozo's
analysis centered on the social circumstances prompting the re-
peal and the reasonableness of the legislative action. He stated:
"What controls our judgment at such times is the underlying
reality rather than the form or label." 8 Although a legislative
declaration of public emergency accompanied the law, 7 the Court
stated that the public welfare would not excuse unreasonable
reductions of the bonds' security.8 8 The Court found the act un-
reasonable because it destroyed the bonds' quality as an
"acceptable investment for a rational investor. 89 Kavanaugh,
then, refined the basic approach of Blaisdell. The Kavanaugh
Court analyzed the practical effect the contested legislation had
on the contracts' value and, in its "rational investor" test, formu-
lated an explicit standard for permissible alterations of state con-
tracts.
In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,90 the
Court specifically applied the approach of Blaisdell and
Kavanaugh to uphold legislation allegedly impairing state con-
tracts. The contested law allowed New Jersey to take over insol-
vent municipalities and implement binding plans adjusting the
creditors' claims.9' Justice Frankfurter stated: "Impairment of an
obligation means refusal to pay an honest debt; it does not mean
contriving ways and means for paying it."'92 He said the state
retained the power to maintain its political subdivisions and
noted the plan actually aided the creditors.93 Accordingly, the
83. E.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934). In Thomas, the Court
struck down a law retroactively exempting the proceeds of life insurance policies from
garnishment. Chief Justice Hughes reaffirmed the principles of Blaisdell, id. at 432-34,
but found the law unreasonable under Blaisdell's standards.
84. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
85. Id. at 62-63.
86. Id. at 62.
87. Id. at 59.
88. Id. at 60.
89. Id.
90. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
91. The plan, however, required consent of 85% of the creditors before it could be
implemented. Id. at 504-05.




Court held that the state action had not, as in Kavanaugh, de-
stroyed the bonds' quality as an acceptable investment." Al-
though the legislation affected "purely financial" state contracts,
Asbury Park nevertheless allowed the legislature to exercise its
reserved power to protect the public.
The Blaisdell line of cases, then, interpreted the contract
clause in light of both the legislative power to serve social inter-
ests and the provision's protection of contract rights. The eco-
nomic and political upheavals of the Depression era forced the
Court to recognize that the clause's "prohibition is not an abso-
lute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathe-
matical formula."95 Although Blaisdell's reasonableness standard
allowed legislatures to exercise their reserved power to protect the
people's vital interests, the Court still employed the contract
clause to check oppressive legislation." Most importantly, none
of the cases suggested a state's impairment of its own obligation
deserved more intensive judicial scrutiny than actions affecting
private contracts."
The last contract clause decision before United States Trust
also refused to distinguish state from private impairments. In
City of El Paso v. Simmons," the Court upheld a law limiting to
five years a formerly unrestricted right of defaulting purchasers
of state land to reinstate their claims. The legislature sought to
alleviate the land speculation, title clouds, and state financial
losses that the perpetual reinstatement rights created? Justice
White's majority opinion, following Blaisdell's approach, gave
the usual wide deference to the legislature's appraisal of the need
for the act and the reasonableness of the legislation's means.1os
Although the impairment in Simmons totally destroyed plain-
tiff's contract, the Court found the perpetual reinstatement right
had not substantially induced the original buyers' undertaking
and held that the repeal did not impair a protected contract
right.'0' Justice Black's dissent, however, argued that the contract
clause does not permit a state to repudiate its own obligations
94. Despite Justice Cardozo's caution that the "rational investor" test of Kavanaugh
stated only the "outermost limits," 295 U.S. at 60, Justice Frankfurter nevertheless explic-
itly applied it in Asbury Park, 316 U.S. at 515.
95. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
96. See text accompanying notes 80-89 supra, note 138 infra.
97. See Hale, supra note 5, at 890-91.
98. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
99. Id. at 515-16.
100. Id. at 508-09.
101. Id. at 514-15.
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without compensating the injured parties, and implied that im-
pairments of state contracts require special treatment. 02
HIL. UNITED STATES TRUST APPROACH
United States Trust's major innovation is the Court's inten-
sive scrutiny of state contract impairments. The Court empha-
sized the special nature of state financial obligations. Relying on
pre-Blaisdell authority, the Court reasoned that when a state
borrows money, the state acts as if it were an individual; 0 3 thus,
a state's interest in financial matters is identical to an individ-
ual's self-interest.104 From this viewpoint, New Jersey's repeal of
the covenant was analogous to an individual unilaterally chang-
ing the terms of a contract. Consequently, the Court concluded
not only that the state's "self-interest" precludes judicial defer-
ence when a legislature alters purely financial contracts, 0 5 but
102. Id. at 527-29 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's dissent invited comparison
between Pery v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) and Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
294 U.S. 240 (1935). Both decisions addressed the validity of a congressional measure
abrogating "gold clauses" in all contracts. "Gold clauses" purported to give obligees a
right to demand payment in gold. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 291. The Norman decision
upheld the measure's application to private contracts as an exercise of Congress's power
to regulate the value of currency. 294 U.S. at 316. The Perry decision, however, stated that
Congress did not have the power to abrogate gold clauses in the federal government's own
contracts. 294 U.S. at 354. The Court stated:
There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or
interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise
of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or repu-
diate the substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money under
the authority which the Constitution confers.
Id. at 350-51. Although the majority opinion in United States Trust cites Perry as author-
ity for a "dual standard" of contract clause review, 431 U.S. at 26 n.25, Perry is dubious
precedent for such a proposition. First, the Perry Court explicitly distinguished the federal
obligation at issue from the obligations of "States or municipalities." 294 U.S. at 348.
Second, Perry did not involve a constitutional provision protecting contract or property
rights; instead, the issue in Perry centered on the conflict between Congress's power to
regulate the value of currency, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, and the constitutional
command that the "validity of the public debt of the United States . . . shall not be
questioned." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. Thus, the conflict between these provisions
created Perry's dual standard. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 53
n.16 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, the Perry Court's "dual standard" was
clearly obiter dictum, see 294 U.S. at 358-61 (Stone, J., concurring), because the Court
held plaintiff could not prove he suffered damages and was thus denied recovery. 294 U.S.
at 358.
103. "The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay
it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary
individuals." Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878), quoted with approval in
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 n.23 (1977).
104. See text accompanying notes 143-46 infra.
105. 431 U.S. at 25-26.
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also that the broad reserved power doctrine of Blaisdell is inap-
propriate.106
Blaisdell's reserved power doctrine, 107 however, is especially
appropriate when a state alters its own contract because courts
should balance the contract clause's prohibition against any re-
sulting abridgment of legislative duties. 0 ' In Asbury Park, the
state's duty to protect the stability of its political subdivisions
justified alterations of "purely financial" bonds; 09 in Simmons,
the legislature's need to correct its predecessor's errors allowed
repudiation of a prior state commitment.1 0 In both cases, the
Court held that the contract clause permitted legislative efforts
to serve important public interests despite the states' roles as
contractual parties. In United States Trust, however, the Court's
analysis of "purely financial" state obligations limits the reserved
power doctrine f'o its pre-Blaisdell form: the Court recognizes a
reserved legislative power to alter state obligations only when the
subject matter of a contract, not its practical effect, threatens the
public interest.
United States Trust's treatment of purely financial state ob-
ligations and the reserved power doctrine also departs from the
analytical approach of modern contract clause decisions. The
main thrust of Blaisdell and its progeny was a reasonableness test
of alleged impairments based on the situation's practical reali-
ties."' Modern decisions tepeatedly criticized the wooden ap-
proach of older cases that turned upon how the Court classified
the state action."2 In United States Trust, however, the Court's"purely financial" label reverts to the pre-Blaisdell approach: the
technical classification of the contract as purely financial ended
inquiry into whether the covenant frustrated the legislature's
power to protect the public."3 United States Trust departs from
the Blaisdell approach of analyzing alleged impairments in light
of their social context. The Court's restrictive analysis of the
106. Id. at 22-23.
107. See text accompanying notes 68-83 supra.
108. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 640-41, 649.
109. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); see text
accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
110. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); see text accompanying notes
98-102 supra.
111. See text accompanying notes 80-89 supra. See also Note, The Role of the Con-
tract Clause in Municipalities' Relations With Creditors, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329-31.
112. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1942);
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60-62 (1935); text accompanying notes 80-
89 supra.
113. See 431 U.S. at 24-25; text accompanying notes 61-67 supra.
1978]
314 University of Puget Sound Law Review
reserved power doctrine stresses the formal nature of the affected
contract, not its practical effect.
The Court's analysis, moreover, departs not only from past
contract clause decisions, but also from the analysis of state sov-
ereignty employed in National League of Cities v. Usery.111 In
National League of Cities, a divided Court struck down the exten-
sion of federal minimum wage standards to states and their politi-
cal subdivisions. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that
the federal legislation displaced the states' sovereign capacity to
prescribe wages for employees who carry out traditional govern-
mental functions and thus, under the federal system of govern-
ment embodied in the Constitution, the legislation was not within
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce."' The Court
stated that one "undoubted attribute" of state sovereignty is the
power to determine the wages of state employees,I' and examined
the impact the wage regulations would have on state functions.,"
Thus, the Court's analysis of state sovereignty in National
League of Cities looked beyond the purely financial nature of
wage decisions and gauged their practical effect on state responsi-
bilities. In United States Trust, however, the Court found the
affected contract was "purely financial" and held, without fur-
ther inquiry, that the covenant did not displace any "essential
attributes of sovereign power." ' Although past contract clause
114. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See generally Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165
(1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAnv. L. Rav. 1065 (1977).
115. 426 U.S. at 851-52.
.116. Id. at 845.
117. Id. at 846-51.
118. 431 U.S. at 23-25. The terms "police power," or "legislative reserved power," or
state "sovereignty" designate nothing more than the residuum of political power the
Federal Constitution leaves the states. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 657. Modem contract
clause decisions prior to United States Trust balanced the contract clause's prohibition
against the state's competing .interest in protecting the public through its reserved,
"sovereign" powers. See text accompanying notes 68-79 supra. In United States Trust,
unlike National League of Cities, the contract clause, as an explicit restraint on state
power, weakens the argument that state "sovereignty" justifies impairments of state
obligations. Nevertheless, members of the Court have shown sympathy to variations of
"sovereignty" arguments in cases where states allegedly have violated other constitutional
restraints. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (lower court's interdistrict school
desegregation plan rejected, in part, for disrupting the structure of state public education
system); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974)
(judicial sanctions against discriminatory appointment practices by state officials may
interfere with state sovereignty); Michelman, supra note 114, at 1166. Furthermore, the
holding in National League of Cities rests on the principal, drawn from the structure of
the Constitution, that certain state functions are free from federal regulation. Logically,
under the Court's analysis in National League of Cities, a state should be free not only
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decisions and National League of Cities recognized the need to
give states discretion in regulating their own financial affairs,
United States Trust not only ignores the effect of financial obliga-
tions on state responsibilities, but also requires rigorous judicial
scrutiny of laws affecting state contracts under its "reasonable
and necessary" standard.
United States Trust's definition of "reasonableness" requires
a showing that "changed circumstances" prompted the contrac-
tual impairment. Under the Court's approach, successor legisla-
tures can modify only contracts that have unforeseen and unin-
tended effects on state policy.' The Court cited Simmons as
authority for its reasonableness criterion.' Although the
Simmons Court did note the unforeseen effects a nineteenth cen-
tury statute had on the state's public land system,12" ' neither the
Court's holding nor analysis purported to restrict "reasonable"
legislation to similar fact situations. 2 Instead, the Simmons
Court stressed that the circumstances leading to the challenged
legislation warranted corrective measures. 23 United States Trust,
however, rejects the Court's former approach of analyzing the
reasonableness of legislative measures in the light of the actual
social problems facing the legislature. Most significantly, under
United States Trust's changed circumstances analysis, the con-
tract clause renders legislatures powerless to alter state contracts
despite changing conceptions of public policy and pressing social
problems.
The Court's definition of "necessary" legislation under the
contract clause also imposes a strict standard of review. Quite
simply, if the Court can hypothesize less drastic means that could
arguably serve the state's ends, the legislation is unconstitu-
tional. 2' Although in previous decisions the Court noted that the
from excessive congressional interference with a state's financial obligations, but also from
excessive federal judicial intervention under the contract clause. See L. TmaE, AMERICAN
CONSTITtrrIONAL LAW 471 (1978). Accordingly, "[o]ne may rightfully feel unease that the
Court is in the process of developing a concept of state sovereignty that is marked neither
by consistency nor intuitive appeal." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
51 n.15 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. 431 U.S. at 31-32; see text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. Chief Justice
Burger's brief concurring opinion noted that permissible contract alterations required the
state to show "that it did not know and could not have known the impact of the contract
on that state interest at the time that the contract was made." 431 U.S. at 32 (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
120. 431 U.S. at 31.
121. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515-16 (1965).
122. See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
123. 379 U.S. at 516-17.
124. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra. The Court's standard of review resem-
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contract clause did not permit states to repudiate their own obli-
gations,' the Court nevertheless deferred to legislative determi-
nations of what measures were appropriate and centered its anal-
ysis on the legislation's effect on the contract's value., In United
States Trust, however, the Court rejected the argument that the
state's policy determinations are matters for legislative discretion
when legislation affects state contracts.1" Instead, the Court's
present approach requires the judiciary to second guess legislative
decisions on highly complex, localized, and volatile issues of eco-
nomic and social policy. United States Trust replaces the defer-
ential reasonableness test of Blaisdell and its progeny with rigor-
ous review of state economic policy challenged under the contract
clause.
If applied literally, the Court's new standard would have
yielded different results in previous contract clause cases. Finan-
cial depressions are a foreseeable risk whenever a state entity
issues bonds. Under United States Trust, the state's program in
Asbury Park to revitalize financially embarrassed municipalities
was unreasonable; because financial depressions are a foreseeable
risk, the legislature could not plead municipal insolvency took
them by surprise. 28 Furthermore, the state's actions were not
necessary; theoretically, the state had the alternative of statewide
taxes to support the troubled bonds. 2 Similarly, in Simmons the
state could have exercised its power of eminent domain and pur-
chased the unlimited redemption rights rendering the legisla-
ture's means not strictly necessary under United States Trust. '30
Although the Court stated the contract clause is not an "absolute
bar" to alterations of state financial promises,' United States
Trust's "reasonableness" and "necessity" test imposes a strin-
gent standard of contract clause review.
bles the "less-restrictive-alternative" standard applied in commerce clause adjudication.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (local milk regulations
invalid because city could have used alternative regulatory schemes imposing a lesser
burden on interstate commerce). Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in United
States Trust noted states must demonstrate that "the impairment was essential to the
achievement of an important state purpose." 431 U.S. at 32 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
125. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
126. See text accompanying notes 84-94 supra.
127. 431 U.S. at 30-31.
128. Id. at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 25.
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IV. POLICY VALUES OF UNITED STATES TRUST
The Court's resolution of the conflicting policy considera-
tions in United States Trust also breaks with recent contract
clause interpretations. The contract clause is a limit on legislative
power similar to other constitutional provisions protecting pri-
vate property rights. 3 ' Modern constitutional jurisprudence,
however, especially in the area of substantive due process, has
granted wide latitude to state policy in economic matters. 3 3 A
comparison of the contract clause's relation to other constitu-
tional guarantees of property rights prior to United States Trust
illustrates the Court's present rejection of judicial deference in
contract clause disputes.
Although some commentators have argued Blaisdell's rea-
sonableness test totally subsumed the contract clause within
fourteenth amendment principles, 3 the contract clause retained
independent significance after Blaisdell. Economic due process
decisions, such as Ferguson v. Skrupa, 35 indicate that the Court
will not overturn economic regulations unless they violate some
other specific constitutional guarantee. 31 Consequently, despite
the demise of substantive economic due process, the contract
clause still provided explicit protection against unlimited state
interference with contract rights. Furthermore, the fourteenth
amendment applies the fifth amendment's protection of prop-
erty, and hence contract rights, to the states.'37 Contract clause
decisions following Blaisdell, however, invalidated laws that were
arguably not uncompensated "takings" of private property be-
cause the state merely altered the legal remedies available for
enforcing contract rights. 3 Thus, the state actions were constitu-
132. The fifth amendment's prohibition against "takings" of private property re-
strains the federal government and, through the fourteenth amendment, the states.
133. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (state economic regulations
are constitutional unless they violate an explicit federal constitutional prohibition or
federal law); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (regulations prohibited former
beneficial use of property but were not an uncompensated "taking" under the fifth amend-
ment); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 264-65.
134. See Hale, supra note 5, at 885; Resurrection of the Contract Clause, supra note
67, at 179.
135. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
136. See Linde, supra note 82, at 185.
137. See generally Contributors to Pa. Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20
(1917).
138. For example, in W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934), discussed
supra note 83, the state, by exempting life insurance proceeds from garnishment did not
expropriate property from anyone. Instead, the state merely refused creditors the right to
compel payment from a particular source of income. Moreoever, the state did not "take"
any property for a public use. Thus, the preconditions of a compensable "taking" under
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tional but for the contract clause. Accordingly, the Blaisdell line
of cases did not render the contract clause superfluous in the
constitutional scheme.
Nevertheless, Blaisdell's deferential standard was consistent
with the Court's general withdrawal from strict judicial review of
government economic policy. The Court's pronouncements that
legislatures have "broad scope to experiment with economic
problems," and that the Court was not a "superlegislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation" sounded the death knell of sub-
stantive economic due process. 139 Although the contract clause
escaped a similar fate, the Court still recognized that a state's
reserved power to protect the public welfare was paramount to
contract rights and that "in this domain of the reserve power of
a state we must respect the 'wide discretion on the part of the
legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary.' ,,10
Among the innumerable explanations offered for the Court's min-
imal scrutiny of actions affecting economic rights, 4 1 perhaps the
most compelling justification is that the inequity, complexity,
and importance of economic activity in modern capitalist society
requires elected representatives, not the judiciary, to determine
the limits of permissible economic policy.142 Yet in United States
Trust, a majority of the Court now considers judicial deference
inappropriate when a state allegedly impairs its own contracts.
The Court's departure from the policy of judicial deference
rests on a superficial notion of a state's "self-interest" in its finan-
cial contracts. 43 The covenant at issue in United States Trust
demonstrates that no matter how obligations are classified, they
can severely limit a state's ability to safeguard its citizens. Thus,
state alterations of financial contracts clearly affect the public's
interests. Furthermore, a legislature acts only through elected
representatives, and all legislative policy is the collective expres-
the fifth amendment were not present. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
B. ScHwAnTz, supra note 5, at 264-65.
139. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963); see Linde, supra note 82, at
165-66.
140. East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945), quoting Manigault
v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
141. Commentators have interpreted this position as (1) merely part of a broader
withdrawal from judicial review of legislative action, (2) recognition that courts lack the
institutional resources and competence to decide economic policy questions, and (3) a
judicial reaction to the excesses of the Lochner era. See generally McCloskey, Economic
Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV.
34-
142. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 665-66.
143. 431 U.S. at 25-26.
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sion of diverse private interests."' Accordingly, whether the Court
reviews private or public contract impairments, the only "self-
interest" a state has is a democratically determined public inter-
est."' The Court's notion of a state's "self-interest" ignores the
need for judicial deference to the workings of the political pro-
cess;'46 the Court scrutinizes a legislature's exercise of the protec-
tive power as if the state were a greedy debtor fleeing a creditor.
Thus, the rationale of the Court's rigorous scrutiny of state obli-
gations is a glib equation of individual and state "self-interest."
Although the Court's rigorous scrutiny may encourage more
careful fiscal management by state and local governments,"' the
Court's special treatment of state contract impairments is unnec-
essary. Whether a proposed state action concerns public or pri-
vate obligations, the ability of interested parties to defend their
interests politically is identical. State creditors may challenge the
need for such action or propose alternative methods of achieving
the desired goals. The Court apparently accepts judicial defer-
ence when a state alters private obligations, but rejects it when a
state alters its own contracts;"18 yet, in either instance, the politi-
cal safeguards of contract rights are the same. Furthermore, state
contract alterations have immediate consequences on a state's
borrowing power. Given the dependence of state and local govern-
ments on private financing, powerful market restraints inhibit
state interference with their debt contracts. Accordingly, United
States Trust's rationale for more intensive scrutiny of state con-
tract impairments is highly questionable.
United States Trust's intensive scrutiny also discounts the
public's interest in modifying state contractual obligations.
Blaisdell interpreted the contract clause in light of both its pro-
tection of contract rights and, through the reserved power doc-
trine, the often countervailing needs of the public. United States
Trust, however, protects bondholders suffering negligible damage
from the covenant's repeal and strikes down the bipartisan efforts
of two state legislatures to serve important public interests.", The
144. See Linde, supra note 82, at 170.
145. Cf. id. at 169-72 (courts must respect the complex political processes of law-
making because of their more democratic nature).
146. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963).
147. Professor Tribe suggests that a stricter reading of the contract clause will also
help protect the contractual rights of public employees. L. TamE, supra note 118, at 471.
Yet public employers generally economize in times of fiscal distress by reducing their work
force. Accordingly, the contract clause provides no practical help for unemployed public
workers.
148. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
149. Id. at 37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Court's rejection of judicial deference and the broad reserved
power doctrine gives the policy of fiscal integrity preferential
treatment when state contracts are at issue.
The Court in United States Trust, then, departs from both
the analytical framework and policy values of previous contract
clause decisions. The Blaisdell line of cases not only applied a
uniform standard of review for state and private contracts, but
also deferred to reasonable legislative policy in economic matters.
Nevertheless, the contract clause still checked political abuses of
state power.'50 United States Trust, however, binds legislatures to
decisions of earlier years and thus infringes the right of citizens
to redirect state policy through the electoral process. The vitality
of modern democratic institutions depends on their ability to
resolve complex economic problems with a minimum of judicial
intervention.'5' Yet, by judicial decree, the Court binds New Jer-
sey to a policy determination made in an era when energy,
transit, and the environment received scant attention. Unfortun-
ately, United States Trust resurrects the contract clause as a"potent instrument for overseeing important policy determina-
tions of the state legislature."'' 52
V. UNITED STATES TRUST AND THE MUNICIPAL DEBT CRISIS
The impact of United States Trust extends far beyond the
decided case. The prospect of future state and municipal debt
crises is a national concern. The 1975 New York City fiscal crisis
led to a state imposed three-year moratorium on enforcing short-
term city obligations. ,53 City creditors challenged the action, but
lower state courts and a federal district court upheld the law from
contract clause attacks.' 54 Although the New York Court of Ap-
peals eventually struck down the law on state constitutional
grounds, the court refused plaintiffs' request to order immediate
payment allowing the city and state additional time to find an
alternative solution.' 5
150. See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
151. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 665-66; 81 DICK. L. REv. 866, 874-76 (1977).
152. 431 U.S. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. See generally Resurrection of the Contract Clause, supra note 67.
154. Ropico, Inc. v. New York, 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Flushing Nat'l
Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1975), aff'd, 52
App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764, rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1976).
155. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Asssitance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d
848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). The court held the moratorium violated the state constitu-
tion's pledge of "full faith and credit" to government obligations. Yet in effect, the court,
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In any future municipal debt crisis, the rationale of United
States Trust would probably reject similar moratorium legisla-
tion under the contract clause. First, the purely financial nature
of the government contracts triggers rigorous scrutiny of the legis-
lation. Second, when a municipality issues bonds the risk of fu-
ture default always exists; thus, subsequent alterations of the
bonds' terms are unreasonable because the state could foresee the
circumstances prompting the moratorium. Finally, a moratorium
is not "necessary" because a state always has the hypothetical
alternatives of further reducing city services, laying off employ-
ees, or diverting general funds to preserve the financial integrity
of political subdivisions.' Accordingly, a debt moratorium af-
fecting municipal bonds would fail the "reasonable and neces-
sary" test. United States Trust, therefore, seriously restricts a
state's policy alternatives when responding to a municipal debt
crisis.
Although the decision's rationale seems to preclude debt
moratorium legislation affecting government obligations, a state
may justify such measures despite United States Trust. Justice
Blackmun distinguished Asbury Park by noting that the legisla-
tion, enacted after the city's default, actually aided the creditors,
even though the state reduced the bonds' original face value.,"7
Because of the difficulties in enforcing claims against insolvent
municipalities, creditors may suffer far more from a municipal
bankruptcy or default than a temporary debt moratorium. 5 ' If
measures aiding creditors after default may be constitutional,
then logically the Court should permit a debt moratorium pre-
venting default because such a measure also aids creditors. Oth-
erwise, under United States Trust, a state could not declare a
moratorium to prevent default, but could alter financial obliga-
tions after default occurs. Clearly, such a prospect illustrates the
need for elected representatives to have a broad range of policy
options for solving government budget crises, especially in light
of the vital functions government services fulfill in modern so-
ciety. 159 Hopefully, in the future a majority of the Court will heed
Justice Brennan's dissent and not wield the contract clause as a
"regulator of the municipal bond market."'10
recognizing the danger of creating a new fiscal crisis, remanded the problem to the legisla-
ture. See 81 DIcK. L. REv. 866, 875 (1977).
156. See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra.
157. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977).
158. See Note, Creditors' Remedies in Municipal Default, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1363.
159. See L. TmBE, supra note 118, at 471.
160. 431 U.S. at 33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's previous approach to contract clause issues
avoided rigid judicial review of state economic policy without
rendering the clause a nullity. The Court's former test of whether
the state action employed reasonable means to achieve a public
purpose, in light of the legislature's protective powers, equitably
balanced individual rights and the public welfare. Furthermore,
the deferential approach of Blaisdell and its progeny allowed
state policy to reflect the current political desires and social needs
of the public. United States Trust, however, breaks sharply from
the analytical approach and public policy values of modern con-
tract clause decisions. The Court lays greater stress on the protec-
tion of state creditors than the competing interest of the state's
ability to safeguard the public interest. In an era where political
turmoil over government fiscal policy is commonplace, United
States Trust is an untimely resurrection of the contract clause as
a rigid guardian of state and city creditors.
Clifford D. Foster Jr.
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